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SMALL GRAINS EXPORT POTENTIAL 
AND GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES IN ZIMBABWE: 
A MEANS-ENDS INCONSISTENCY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The potential 'for Zimbabwe to develop viable small grain1 export 
markets within the SADCC region will depend crucially on:
1. Zimbabwe's ability to produce reliable marketed; sorghum 
and millet surpluses at a cost low enough to ne 
competitive with C.I.F. import prices of coarse grains in 
other SADCC countries: and
2. the development of reliable and effective import demand 
for small grains among other SADCC countries.
Inherent within conditions (1) are questions related to the 
incidence of response to increased small grain production 
incentives, the strong random influence of weather as a determinant 
of small grain export supplies, transport constraints and other 
marketing problems. Within conditions (2) are issued concerning 
the reliability of weather-induced import demand within the region, 
the enthusiasm of donors to finance triangular transactions over 
the long run, and the scope for other SADCC countries to translate 
their stated food self-sufficiency goal in reality. This paper 
examines the potential for these two fundamental conditions to be 
met, and more broadly considers whether their achievement would 
actually be consistent with Zimbabwe's agricultural policy 
objectives.
Before discussing these issues formally, we consider the context 
and rationale for considering small grain export potential from 
Zimbabwe's standpoint. Shortly after independence in 1980, the 
Government of Zimbabwe committed itself to improving the 
productivity and income of smallholders. However, it became 
evident that the Zimbabwean "maize revolution" — the tripling of 
communal sector grain production and the tenfold increase in 
communal sector sales to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) between 
1980 and 1985 —  had largely bypassed Zimbabwe's drier communal 
area (Rohrbach, 1989; Amin, 1988). To redress this situation, the 
Government in 1984 adopted an income policy for dryland areas using 
small grain marketing and pricing policy as instruments. In 1984, 
bulrush and finger millet —  crops agronomically suited to semi- 
arid areas —  were declared controlled crops. Sorghum and millet 
price were set at levels to encourage expanded production in the 
nation's dryland areas. The network of
1$mall grains are normally defined to consist of red and white 
sorghum, mhunga (bulrush millet) and rapoko (finger millet).
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GMB buying points was expanded considerably in low-rainfall 
regions.
A half-decade later, the government is still trying to cope with 
the costly consequences of this strategy. While successful in 
stimulating small grain deliveries to the GMB —  though primarily 
from the commercial sector —  strategies to concomitantly 
stimulate small grain demand were lacking. As a result, government 
sorghum and millet stocks had risen . to unprecedented levels,2 
requiring huge price discounts in order to dispose of rapidly 
deteriorating stocks. In this glut situation, producer prices of 
these crops have been allowed to decline with inflation over the 
past five years. In addition millet and red sorghum have been 
partially decontrolled, and the extensive GMB collection point 
system established in 1985 has been sharply curtailed. Relatively 
few GMB facilities remain in the nation's semi-arid regions.
The lesson learned from this experience is that small grain 
utilization problems are perhaps the biggest constraints on 
increased small grain production. In this context, exploring 
opportunities to create new markets for small grain disposal, among 
them export markets, assume particular importance. However, the 
ability to create such markets (conditions 1 and 2 above) would not 
necessarily mean that it would be desirable for government to do 
so. The viability of investing in small grain export capacity is 
a function of the government's objectives in relation to its small 
grain policy. We assume from various policy pronouncements that 
the government primarily seeks through its small grains' policy to 
promote income growth and food security for the three million 
smallholders living in semi-arid areas in Zimbabwe, and to 
efficiently generate foreign exchange revenue (Takavarasha, 1990).. 
Under these assumptions, it is unclear whether conditions (1) and 
(2) above —  even if they could be achieved —  would appreciably 
promote either income growth in dryland areas or the efficient 
generation of foreign exchange.
The remainder of the paper develops the arguments leading to this 
conclusion. Section 2 considers Zimbabwe's ability to produce a 
reliable exportation small grain surplus, and the potential 
beneficiaries of small grain marketing and price incentives 
necessary to induce such art exportation surplus. Section 3 and 4 
examine the potential magnitude and reliability of import demand 
within the SADCC region. Conclusions and policy implications are 
discussed in section 5. In particular, we suggest the existence of 
a means-ends inconsistency between a policy of deliberate
2 For example, in 1987, GMB sorghum stocks were four times 
higher than annual domestic sales. Bulrush and finger millet 
stocks stood at 34 and 36 times the level of annual domestic sales, 
respectively (Mbwanda and Rohrbach, 1989)
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investment in small grain export capacity and the goals of income 
growth among dryland smallholders and efficient foreign exchange 
generation.
II. PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS 
2.1 Exportation Surplus; Potential
The recent experience of massive small grain stocks has tended to 
obscure the fact that Zimbabwe farmers failed four times since 1980 
to produce and sell enough sorghum to the government to meet 
commercial domestic demand (Figure 1). While the reasons for this 
include deliberate marketing policy disincentives these include the 
withdrawal of GMB collection points from many semi-arid communal 
areas and lower real producer prices (1987) as well as drought 
(1980, 1982, 1983), it is clear that sorghum intake during the
1980s has not been consistently high enough to generate a reliable 
exportation surplus. The three years of clear surplus (1981, 1985 
and 1986) were all due to a combination of abnormally good rainfall 
and /or a proliferation of GMB buying points. In all three years, 
the deliveries came primarily from commercial farming areas.
These facts should not be construed to mean that Zimbabwe cannot 
produce a consistently reliable small grains surplus, for it surely 
can —  given sufficient government resources and commitment. Such 
a commitment may fall into one of the possible categories: (1)
investments in improved production and processing technology: (2) 
price policy; and (2) improved market infrastructure. While option 
(1) probably provides the greatest potential in the long run, this 
analysis confines itself to measure (2) and (3) which are feasible 
within the short and medium run.
Price Policy:
A strategy of attempting to enhance incomes and food security for 
smallholders in semi-arid areas through producer price incentives 
for small grains would be ineffective and perhaps
counterproductive. This is clear from examining the skewed nature 
of marketed grain surplus in Zimbabwe. Between 1984 and 1989, 45 
percent of all GMB sorghum intake came from three GMB depots in the 
commercial farming areas (Figure 2). Within the communal areas, 
GMB intake is also highly skewed, owing to the significant 
variation in productive potential among smallholders. Intake of 
mhunga and rapoko — - crops grown predominantly within the communal 
areas -- came mainly from several high potential areas in NR II and 
III (Figures 3 and 4). In fact, available evidence over the past 
few years suggests that most smallholders in Natural Regions IV and 
V, representing about 60 percent of Zimbabwe's communal sector 
population, sell little or no grain at all (Rohrbach, 1989; Chigume 
and Jayne, forthcoming; Hedden-Dunkhorst, 1989). Many are in fact 
dependent on the market to buy grain or grain meal because they do 
not produce enough to meet their own family requirements.
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F  i g u r e  1  :
Offical Sorghum Intake and Exportable 
Surplus: Zimbabwe, 1970-1987
1 0 0 0  mt
Rohrbach, 1989
FIGURE 2: SORGHUM DELIVERIES TO MAJOR DEPOTS
GMB Depot Codes
Aps: Aspindale i ^ V Chg: Chegutu Buh: Buhera
Cle: Cleveland Dam : Ban: Banket ^ v Shm: Shamva
Mtk: Mutoko Msv: Masvingo Kad: Kadoma
Mut: Mutare chi: Chinhoyi Mis: Middle Sabi
Lio: Lions Den
Source: GMB Files : v
; 5
FIGURE 4: RAPOKO DELIVERIES TO GMB DEPOTS
1000 t
GMB Depot Codes
Cle: Cleveland Dam Chy: Chinyudze Mtk: Mutoko
Ktw: Kotwa Nyg: Nyanga Bab: Bazeley Bridge
Sdz: Sadza Tbm: Timbermills Buh: Buhere
Mhd: Mhondoro Nyk: Nkayi Gut: Gutu
Civ: Chivu ; By 6: Bulawayo Kwe: Kwe Kwe ,
Gke: Gokwe Nzy: Nembudziya
Source: GMB Files •,
.6
FIGURE 3: BULRUSH MILLET DELIVERIES TO GMB DEPOTS
GMB Depot Codes
Mtk: Mutoko  ^ Mur: Murewa; V Bab: Bazeley Bridge
Mut: Mutare Rus: Rusape Tim: Timber-mills
Buh: Buhere Misy:: Masvipgo Gut: Gutu
Byo:Bulawayo KwekWe :1 Mis: Middle Sabi
Lio: Lions Den
Source: GMB Files
A higher GMB producer price may rechannel grain sold by a minority 
of surplus producers from local communal area markets to the GMB, 
thus raising informal acquisition prices in semi-arid communal area 
and impeding access to grain by deficit households.3 These 
results suggest that under current market arrangements, price 
policy designed to generate an exportable small grain surplus will 
have very concentrated benefits and potentially adverse effects on 
grain-deficit smallholders.
Market Infrastructure and Regulation:
Selective improvements in market access may be a vehicle to 
generate an exportable surplus in the process of channelling 
benefits to a specific strata of the population. For example, the 
development of GMB collection points or processing facilities in 
low-rainfall communal areas may induce greater small grain 
deliveries from these areas. Alternatively, quotas could be set on 
commercial sector deliveries in order to increase the proportion of 
intake from the communal areas and thus the benefits of GMB market 
access. However, both of these schemes suffer from the fact that 
•they may extract grain out of local informal markets to the 
detriment of food insecure households who lack the resources to 
raise production even if the incentives to do so were significantly 
increased. In addition, these schemes would tend to shift the 
geographical composition of production and sales from stable 
surplus-production areas to relatively unstable, drought-affected 
areas where the GMB has tended to operate at a substantial 
financial loss, as recent experience has shown.
Apart from whether Zimbabwe could generate a reliable exportable 
surplus of small grains, it is not clear that this would represent 
the most-effective use of scarce resources, especially given the 
potential that other crops, such as cotton, sunflower and 
groundnut, among others, may promote income growth among semi-arid 
smallholders and generate foreign exchange more efficiently than 
small grains. These issues, subsumed in the general evaluation of 
comparative advantage of small grains in Zimbabwe, are currently 
being analyzed by Masters (forthcoming). The important point here 
is that given historical levels of government resources primarily 
prices and marketing infrastructures devoted to small grains, a
3While we have considered only the direct effects of a higher 
price of grain on income distribution, there are potential 
secondary effects which deserve greater attention. For example, a 
higher price may stimulate acreage expansion among relatively well- 
endowed farmers, eliciting on employment effect that could 
conceivably promote incomes among the poor. However, preliminary 
evidence in Mutoko and Buhera communal areas suggests that this 
secondary effect is relatively weak (chigume and Jayne, 
forthcoming).
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consistently reliable small grains surplus cannot be assured.
2.2 Reliability of Exportable Surplus
Zimbabwe's potential to develop durable small grain export markets 
depends not only on stimulating the average level of supply 
relative to domestic utilization, but on increasing the stability 
of that supply. Exportable surplus (ES), i.e., the surplus
available after domestic; utilization to be wither stored or 
exported, is identically equal to domestic deliveries to the GMB 
(DD) minus domestic sales (DS), representing primarily the demand 
of stockfeeders millers and brewers. By taking the variance of be 
decomposed into the following terms:
(1) VAR (ES) = VAR (DD)- VAR (DS) -2*C0V (DD< DS)
Using data in Mbwanda and Rohrbach (1988) over the 1975-89 period, 
it is clear that the overwhelming proportion variation in 
exportable surplus, 112 percent, was associated with variations in 
domestic GMB deliveries.4 5 Variation in domestic sales was
associated with only 14.2 percent of the total variation in 
exportable surplus. This makes it clear that efforts to develop a 
reliable exportation surplus must focus on stabilizing GMB intake 
from commercial and communal producers.
The.reliability of GMB intake is a function of the proportion of 
small grain area cultivated in the various natural regions. This 
is because the stability of production and intake tend to vary 
widely between natural regions and relatedly, between commercial 
and communal farming areas. One indicator of the relative 
magnitude of instability among data series is the standard 
.deviation of annual percentage changes. This indicator measures 
the expected percentage change in production from one year to the 
next.3
4The fact that this figure is over 100 percent is because the 
covariance between domestic deliveries and sales is negative. This 
is because aS production and deliveries are low, more tends to be 
demanded from-the GMB by stockfeeders and other consumers to make 
up for the shortfall, and vice versa. This phenomenon has also 
been noted by Blackie (1984) and Lele and Candler (1984).
5This holds if the variable in question approximates a normal 
distribution, an assumption which is supported by an assessment of 
the data over: both the 1975-1989 and the 1980-1989 periods. 
Further properties of this indicator are that (1) it implicitly 
accounts :for any trend components in the data, and (2) it is a 
measure of relative rather than absolute variability and thus 
accounts for the fact that sorghum production in the communal lands 
is higher than in commercial farming areas.
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The results indicate that small grain production and intake since 
1975 have been substantially more unstable from the communal sector 
than from the commercial sector (Table 1). The expected absolute 
percentage change in GMB intake was over 140 percent from the 
communal sector and about 115 percent from the commercial sector. 
The relatively high degree of instability within the communal lands 
is partly weather-induced; this source of instability, which 
becomes more severe as one moves into the low-rainfall areas, 
accounts for the single largest source of communal area production 
instability for both sorghum, mhunga and maize (table 2) .6 The 
greater the share of production in drier areas —  where the 
intended beneficiaries of government small grains policy live —  
the more variable the intake, and the greater the risk of having 
nothing to export.
While the magnitude of supply instability is currently extremely 
high, the preceding analysis indicates that national GMB intake may 
be subject to even greater variability as more land is shifted from 
higher potential zones to relatively semi-arid communal lands that 
are more prone to drought. The higher variability of sales from 
the communal sector is also due to different strategies for growing 
grains between the two sectors. In the commercial sector, coarse 
grains are primarily cash crops and therefore almost all the grain 
produced is sold to the GMB. In the communal sector however, 
households grow grain primarily for household usage, and would 
attempt to maintain their consumption level during a drought year 
be selling less. If, for example, 80 percent of production is for 
subsistence, then a 10 percent decline in production would lead to 
a ,50 percent decline in sales (i.e., from the 20 percent of 
production that is marketed). For this reason, variability in 
Zimbabwe's exportable small grain surplus is significantly higher 
than the variability in small grain production.
6See Appendix 1 concerning how production variability is 
decomposed into area and yield components.
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Standard Deviation-in Annual Percentage Changes 
in Grain Production and Intake (1975-1989)
STD of annual % change in
. Table 1
Production GMB intake
(000 mt) (000 mt)
COMMUNAL:
SORGHUM 104 144
MHUNGA 107 — ”
MAIZE 53 102
COMMERCIAL'.';-.';
SORGHUM 69 114
MAIZE 41 56 :
Table 2
Sources of Production Instability in Communal and Commercial
Grain Production
■ % of variance in production from:
■'•variance variance covariance 
(AREA) (YIELD) (AREA,YIELD)
.COMMUNAL?
SORGHUM 11 70 19
MHUNGA ' 24 39 37
MAIZE 5 67 28
COMMERCIAL:
SORGHUM ■ 38 ■ 31 34
Source: Food Security Database, UZ
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2.3 Relationship between Supply Instability in Zimbabwe and 
Potential SADCC Importers.
The foregoing analysis suggests that Zimbabwe's current ability to 
produce an exportable small grain surplus is greatly affected by 
supply instability, which is in turn largely weather-influenced. 
The degree to which such fluctuation are correlated with production 
and import demand in neighboring SADCC states will critically 
effect the development of small grain trade within the region.
The higher the risk that Zimbabwe would have nothing to export when 
other countries need grain, the higher the probability that self- 
sufficiency policies will be pursued elsewhere in the region, thus 
drying up the potential for viable long run trading opportunit ies. 
To the extent that weather affects production among SADCC countries 
in a similar way (positive correlation), the more likely that high 
import demand in other countries will coincide with lower export 
potential in Zimbabwe. However, if production in Zimbabwe 
fluctuates inversely with production in neighboring countries 
(negative correlation), the more likely that high import demand in 
other countries will coincide with large exportable surpluses in 
Zimbabwe. Table 3 presents correlation coefficients for sorghum 
production among seven SADCC states, highly so in the case of 
Zambia and Botswana, two potential small grain importers. This 
result dampens, but in no way precludes, the development of small 
grain export potential in Zimbabwe.
One important qualifier to the above is that an export niche for 
specific types of sorghum may be developed at fairly low cost. For 
example, High-quality red malting sorghum may be consistently 
demanded irrespective of the weather, by foreign commercial brewers 
within the SADCC region. Moreover, commercial millers have 
indicated that they represent a ready market for high quality white 
sorghum if the grains could be sorted during the marketing process 
according to grain kernel size and sold accordingly. This would 
require more rigorous grading and standardizing procedures at the 
GMB, but could bring high payoffs in. terms of capturing what 
appears to ne ah unmet demand for high-quality sorghum. Demand by 
foreign commercial millers and brewers, apparently driven more by 
quality standards rather than domestic production shortfalls, would 
be less affected by weather fluctuations. The major limitation' 
here is that the volume of demand would nevertheless be quite 
small.
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Correlation Coefficients of Sorghum Production between 
Zimbabwe and other SADCC Countries: 1970-1986
Table 3
Zimbabwe
BOTSWANA .52
ZAMBIA , ' .49
TANZANIA .39
MALAWI .22
MOCAMBIQUE .21
LESOTHO . 06
Sources Technosynesis and FAO Production, Yearbooks, various 
years„
Three conclusions may be drawn from the discussion thus far. 
First, Zimbabwean small grain production is highly variable and 
positively correlated with production fluctuations in other SADCC 
states. This increases the risks of investing in surplus small 
grain production, since in a good rainfall year throughout the 
region, Zimbabwe may find itself with a large exportable surplus 
and few external markets in which to dispose of it; Second, the 
high variability of sorghum and millet intake means that the GMB 
may have little to export in excess of domestic requirements during 
drought years. Despite high stocks in recent years, Zimbabwe has 
not been able to produce a consistent small grain surplus since 
1970. A greater allocation of government resources Will be 
necessary to appreciably stimulate the level of surplus required to 
make Zimbabwe a reliable exporter. Third, the ability for Zimbabwe 
to produce a consistent expbrtable surplus will depend crucially oh 
the proportion of Small grain cultivation in the higher potential 
areas, especially in Natural Regions IT and III. Unfortunately, 
this presents something of a meanS-ends inconsistency. Enhancing 
the incentives for small grain production and marketing in the high 
potential areas appears to be necessary for viable trade potential, 
but these incentives would be captured primarily by people other 
than the intended beneficiaries of the government1s small grain 
policy. Improved technology appropriate for low-rainfall areas 
appears to be necessary before the link between small grain trade 
and enhanced incomes for communal farmers in semi-arid areas can be 
established.
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Given the thinness of the world market for small grains, coupled 
with the high bridging costs of exporting grain from landlocked 
Zimbabwe to world markets, the scope for commercial small grain 
exports appears to be limited primarily to neighboring SADCC 
markets. This theoretical limitation has been born out by reality: 
since 1970, Zimbabwe is commercially exported less than 20,000 
tonnes of sorghum, primarily to it SADCC neighbors ( Mbwanda and 
Rohrbach, 1989). Hence, to state with, Zimbabwe's potential 
commercial clients will comprise a narrow range of countries.
A prerequisite for "potential" is a deficit in one or more of these 
countries for which effective demand exists. Zimbabwe's purpose 
for developing a small grains exportable surplus.is of course not 
to present gifts. A major intention, we presume, is to earn 
foreign currency. However, with the exception of Botswana, 
Zimbabwe's potential SADCC trading partners suffer from severe 
foreign exchange constraints and non-convertible currencies. 
Triangular transaction arrangements could offer a solution to this 
problem, from the standpoint of both Zimbabwe and its grain deficit 
neighbors, but small trade built on this foundation would be 
dependent on continued donor largess. At least in the short and 
medium-run, foreign currency shortage will constraints effective 
demand in the SADCC region for all grains.
Since most of the neighboring countries will prefer to offer non- 
convertible currencies, it may be in Zimbabwe's interest to explore 
whether mutually beneficial barter trade could be developed 
involving small grain export.
As mentioned above, the greatest potential for a durable effective 
demand for small grain may come from the commercial brewing 
industries within the region. High-quality sorghum with desirable 
malting characteristics may fetch an attractive price, but demand 
is fairly limited. Demand for sorghum as - a livestock feed is 
constrained by relatively low per capita incomes in the region 
needed to fuel commercial livestock consumption, and by price 
policies that make maize relatively cheap compared with small 
grains.
An evaluation of the potential for Zimbabwean small grain exports 
must distinguish between three types of potential importers: (1) 
those countries with a trade potential based on structural deficits 
and effective demand; (2) those countries with structural deficits 
but low effective demand; and (3) those countries approaching self- 
sufficiency and sporadically entering the market as importer only 
when rainfall is poor. Although countries fitting under the first 
category offer the most promise for the development of durable 
trade links, dew countries in the SADCC region fit this 
description. Botswana may most nearly fit category (1), yet
III. IMPORT DEMAND CONSTRAINTS
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Zimbabwe will continue to face stiff competition from the republic 
of South Africa (RSA) to supply this market. The RSA's continued 
willingness to heavily subsidise its grain exports will greatly 
affect the size of Zimbabwe's future grain export market in the 
region; It is apparent from the dearth of small grain trade within 
the entire SADCC region that most countries most nearly fit into 
categories (2) and (3) . The degree to which millet and sorghum 
production fluctuates among Zimbabwe's potential trading partners 
(Figures 5 and 6) indicates a highly uncertain and variable export 
market.
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In an environment of deteriorating transport capacity within the 
SADCC region, the logistics of exploiting trade opportunities 
become more difficult, especially for relatively high-volume/low- 
value commodities such as sorghum and millet. The competitiveness 
of Zimbabwe's small grain exports in relation to exports from 
foreign suppliers is presented in Figure 7 and 8. From the 
standpoint of Malawi, for example, it would not have been 
economically viable to import sorghum from Zimbabwe under 
commercial te:rms at any time since 1980, since it could have been 
acquired at lower cost from the would market. A similar 
observation held for all import markets requiring ocean freight, 
such as Somalia or Ethiopia (Figure 8). The contribution of 
transport constraints to Zimbabwe's status as a high-cost supplier 
is illustrated by the fact during most years since 1980, it was 
less costly to move a tonne of grain to Llilongwe, Malawi from the 
US Gulf than to transport it overland from nearby Harare. This 
suggests that apart from subsidised* sales or triangular 
transactions, Zimbabwe's small grain export niche is very narrow.
Export agencies for any commodity need to know the type of agency 
that will be their customer in other countries, specifically the 
small grain quality characteristics sought by various potential 
buyers. In Zambia, for example, local producers and traders 
distribute grain through well established and sometimes elaborate 
distribute grain through well established and sometimes elaborate 
market networks. Local traders are well aware of the timing of 
disposal on their markets and the quality characteristics that are 
preferred ny industrial and non-industrial consumers. As mentioned 
above, opaque beer producers prefer sorghum varieties with specific 
malting characteristics. A small grain export strategy in Zimbabwe 
that estimates potential demand for these specific niches and then 
attempts to produce the desired varieties may more successfully 
develop a durable, consistent regional small grain trade than a 
strategy that looks at neighboring countries as places to vent 
sporadic surpluses during years of good whether and/or high stocks.
A selective targeting strategy based on consumption preference in 
other countries would also be more impervious to the unpredictable 
impact of food aid injections into the SADCC region. For example, 
food aid organization dealing with famine relief, while necessary 
to reduce hunger, may present major dislocation in the grain 
economy of regional surplus producers such as Zimbabwe. It is 
certainly not inconceivable that future commercial sales of 
Zimbabwean small grains are crowded out by subsidised or free grain 
from donor countries suffering from excess supply problems. In 
such an environment, deliberations regarding a long-run small grain 
export policy in Zimbabwe may strongly benefit from consideration 
of the potential impacts of the political economy of international 
grain markets.
IV. EXPORT MARKETING CONSTRAINTS
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FIGURE 7: SORGHUM IMPORT PRICES ATMALAWI BORDER
I. GMB sorghum selling price + overland transport costs from 
Harare to Malawi border (US$.19/tonne/km).
II. U.S. Gulf sorghum price + freight rate Nacala, Mozambique 
+ overland transport costs to Malawi border.
III. Informal market price in Blantyre and Malawi.
IV. Informal farm gate price, selected markets in Malawi
Sources: Mbwanda and Rohrbach (1988); Louis Berger (1986);
International Wheat Council (1987).
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FIGURE 8: INTERNATIONAL SORGHUM PRICES AT BEIRA PORT
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International financial markets may also influence the viability of 
small grain export transaction in particular cases. Since most 
grain transactions are denominated in US dollars or a similar hard 
currency, volatile exchange rate fluctuation may greatly affect the 
operating account of the GMB.
Finally, the over viability of small grain trade within the region 
depends greatly on the infrastructural and institutional progress 
made in promoting overall trade and integration within SADCC. In 
this sense, enhanced small grain trade potential may be a positive 
side affect of broader efforts to vivify SADCC regional 
integration.. Such benefits, however, must be seen as long-run in 
nature, and do not appear to be on the immediate horizon.
Agricultural policies are conceived and implemented in order to 
benefit some group or groups. Whether or not small grain exports 
from Zimbabwe should be promoted depends on the government's 
objectives with respect to its small graifts policy. We have 
assumed that these objectives include an equity dimension —  to 
promote income growth among smallholders in areas which have 
benefitted little from the "maize revolution" and an efficiency 
dimension —  to generate the greatest foreign exchange from a given 
level of national resources.
In this regard, the development of a viable small grain export 
potential in Zimbabwe will be affected by the following pointss-
1. Zimbabwean small grain production is positively correlated 
with production in other SADCC countries, due to somewhat 
homogeneous weather patterns in the region. This pattern of
b synchronous production fluctuation raises the risks of 
investing in surplus production capacity, since good weather 
evaporate at the same time that Zimbabwe produces a large 
exportable surplus. ,
2. Small grain production and sales in Zimbabwe are highly 
concentrated. Commercial farmers account for about 75 percent 
of GMB red Sorghum intake. One-half of all smallholder 
sorghum deliveries during the bumper harvest of 1985 came from 
five -'of Zimbabwe's 162 communal areas.. ; ...In this setting 
attempts to induce greater small grain sales for export by 
raising producer prices will have very concentrated benefits, 
and may actually exacerbate the welfare of those .that the 
government presumably is most actively trying to improve. 
Insofar as high GMB prices raise local village sorghum and 
millet prices, the poorest producers facing production 
deficits are being forced to pay more for their grain (Mbwanda 
and Rohrbach, 1989).
3. White sorghum, grown mainly in communal areas, may offer the 
greatest compatibility between government objectives and 
enhanced small grain exports. A limited but durable export 
demand may be generated from SADCC commercial millers 
attempting to reduce foreign exchange costs of bread 
manufacturing. However, better grain size standardization is 
necessary at the GMB to translate this potential demand into
■ reality.- ■ '
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
4. Import demand for small grains within the SADCC region is- very 
thin and specialized. The longer run prospects for a- broader, 
regional demand are uncertain, due to uncertain future income 
growth within the region as well as the longstanding 
proclivity of neighboring countries to pursue self—sufficiency 
'objectives.
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5. Developing durable marketing infrastructure and information 
about import opportunities is costly, and might not be cost 
effective in terms of expected low trade volumes.
6. Present foreign currency regulations are obstacles to trade, 
and the same barriers limited intra-regional SADCC trade in 
general also apply to small grains in particular (Koester, 
1986: Kingsbury, 1989).
7. Crops budgets with Ministry of Lands for small grain and
other exportable crops economically well-suited to semi-arid 
areas must be carefully analysed in order to evaluate the 
relative efficiency of foreign exchange generation from small 
grains. It appears to be a common perception that cotton and 
sunflower may generally afford better returns on world markets 
than most small grain varieties. More detailed analysis of 
crop budgets under a variety of communal and commercial 
farming characteristics would be valuable in clarifying the 
cost-effectiveness of long-run investments in sorghum and 
millet production and marketing to stimulate exports.
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a p p e n d i x  l
The source of production instability may be determined by 
decomposing the variance of annual percentage changes in production 
into area and yield components. Starting with the identity that 
production (PROD) equals the product of area (A) and Yield (Y), the 
total derivative of production is:
d(PROD) = Y*d(A) + A*d(Y)
Dividing both sides of the equation by PROD gives: 
d(PROD)/PROD = d(A)/A + d(Y)/Y 
Taking the variance of both sides gives:
Variance [d(PROD)/PROD] = Variance [d(A)/A] + Variance (d(Y)/Y]
+ 2*Govariance [d(A)/A, d(Y)/Y]
■ This technique allows one to discern the proportion of production 
variation attributable to yield and area instability as well as the 
interactions between them The results of the decomposition 
technique are presented in Table 3.
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